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INTRODUCTION

Throughout the decades, public health crises have shaped the regulation of
drug approvals and public access to newly invented drug treatments.1 In 1962,
for instance, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) introduced stringent
testing and approval procedures in response to serious birth defects from the use
of thalidomide by pregnant females without sufficient safety testing.2 The FDA
was prompted yet again to implement new strategies in approving drugs as a
result of the AIDS crisis. New policies and regulations were proposed and
implemented, including features of European systems, which accelerated access
to new experimental drugs for life-threatening illnesses.3 The reality of the
situation at the apex of the AIDS crisis showed the inadequacy of FDA processes

*
Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2017; B.A. with Honors in
Political Science and German, College of the Holy Cross, 2013. I would like to thank my adviser Professor
Alford along with the many mentors I have been fortunate to have during my time at Notre Dame. A
special thank you to my family, especially my parents and fiancé, for their constant support and their
unconditional love throughout my entire academic career.
1
See Harvey Teff, Drug Approval in England and the United States, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 567, 573
(1985).
2
21 ROBERT JOHN KANE & LAWRENCE E. SINGER, THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE IN ILLINOIS 15
(3d ed. 2015).
3
See generally Julie C. Relihan, Expediting FDA Approval of AIDS Drugs: An International
Approach, 13 B.U. INT’L L. J. 229, 238 (1995).
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from the perspective of terminally ill, frustrated patients. Not only did a true drug
lag exist between foreign countries and the United States (U.S.), it was argued
that there was also no adequate existing treatment available in the first instance.4
As Wells commented,
The problem that the AIDS crisis presents is quite different than
those resulting from other diseases. As of this writing, no
clearly effective treatment exists. Additionally, the disease
appears to be inevitably fatal. Desperate AIDS sufferers are
crying out for access to treatment drugs which they know are
still experimental and unproven. Arguably, under these special
circumstances, such individuals should be allowed to make that
choice.5
This debate over the access to experimental and investigational treatments for
life-threatening illnesses has not ceased to exist. Quite to the contrary, the push
for better and faster access to experimental treatment has only gotten stronger. In
a contested court case, Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, terminally ill patients
advocated in the U.S. for a fundamental right “to try” experimental treatments.6
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
patients had no fundamental right, protected under due process, to have access to
investigational drugs.7
The importance of the debate over access to experimental treatment is still
very much alive and well, as seen from the events surrounding the 2014 Ebola
crisis and what many deem to be a wholly inadequate and inefficient response to
the Ebola outbreak.8 The outbreak called for the ultimate ethical conundrum as
the World Health Organization (WHO) proceeded to allow the use of drug
treatments—that were entirely unapproved and only tested on animals—on
patients suffering from the life-threatening diseases.9 Generally, the use of
experimental treatments in the Ebola outbreak showed that “[m]uch more ethical
work needs to be done to create a sound infrastructure for compassionate use in
humanitarian emergencies.”10 Ebola prompted a dialogue about the ethical and
legal ramifications of expediting access to pharmaceutical products that have not

4
See generally Anne E. Wells, Comment, Regulating Experimental AIDS Drugs: A Comparison of
the United States and France, 12 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 393 (1990).
5
Id. at 410–11.
6
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 707
(D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1159 (2008).
7
See generally id.; see also Allison J. Goodman, Comment, Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach:
Restricting Access to Potentially Lifesaving Drugs Since 2007, 25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 107,
125 (2009).
8
See James G. Hodge et al., Global Emergency Legal Responses to the 2014 Ebola Outbreak, 42 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 595 (2014); see also James G. Hodge, Jr., Legal Myths of Ebola Preparedness and
Response, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 355, 356 (2015); see also Alexandra Sifferlin, WHO
Vows Reform After Ebola Outbreak Mistakes, TIME (May 18, 2015), http://time.com/3882556/who-reformebola-outbreak-mistakes/.
9
See Kai Kupferschmidt, Using Experimental Drugs and Vaccines Against Ebola is Ethical, WHO
Panel Says, SCIENCE MAG. (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/08/usingexperimental-drugs-and-vaccines-against-ebola-ethical-who-panel-says.
10
Id.
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gone through adequate testing and approval procedures. The questionable ethical
atmosphere in which experimental treatments are afforded persists in global
health dialogue, even after the release of successful results related to a new,
promising Ebola vaccine.11
It has also spurred an entire movement throughout the U.S., which has
resulted in over twenty states introducing “Right to Try” bills since early 2014.12
The FDA has been the subject of allegations regarding its perceived different
behavior in times of crisis as compared to times in which terminally ill patients
domestically seek outlets to retrieve experimental treatments. As Furchtgott-Roth
criticizes, “[i]f [the] FDA applied the same sense of urgency to Ebola vaccines in
the past or to other drugs in its pipeline, millions of people would be better off.
Instead, it stalls until a crisis arises, resulting in more deaths and untold
suffering.”13 How the FDA imagines its role in protecting the public health and
upholding safety and efficacy in the regulation of pharmaceutical products in light
of this legislative and politically charged movement remains to be seen.
Regardless, the most recent Ebola crisis and the “Right to Try” movement help
illuminate an age-old debate in a new period of time. The ethical, legal, and
regulatory interests at stake shape the role of the FDA as well as the role drug
regulation plays internationally both in times of public health crises and in their
aftermath. If anything, the legal issues in the pharmaceutical industry have
become more “complex and politicized because of the increase in global trade.”14
The regulation of pharmaceutical products generally requires a balance of
various factors, most importantly public access to accurate information on
medicines, continued confidence in health systems and professionals, and
assurance that the manufacture, trade, and use of medicines is under appropriate
and efficient regulation.15 In many respects, the regulation of drugs is quite
different from other industries in that it concerns the population as a whole as
well as serious consequences, including injury and death.16 What many frustrated
patients neglect in conversations on pharmaceutical legislation and policy is that
“[t]rying to achieve too much, too quickly, can be tempting[,]” but “[i]t took more
than a hundred years for pharmaceutical policies and laws to evolve to current
levels in the industrialized world.”17
This Note will explore the regulations and exceptions to the traditional drug
approval process created by the FDA in order to respond to public health crises as
well as the wishes and needs of terminally ill patients who have advocated for
expanded access. Part I will highlight the regulatory framework in existence,
exploring the traditional drug approval process, and detailing the various
exceptions and expanded access and compassionate use programs. Subsection A
11
See generally Annette Rid & Franklin G. Miller, Ethical Rationale for the Ebola “Ring
Vaccination” Trial Design, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 432 (2016).
12
Alexander Gaffney, “Right to Try” Legislation Tracker, REG. AFF. PROF’L SOC’Y, (June 25, 2015)
http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/Right-to-Try/ (last vistied Mar. 9, 2017).
13
Diane Furchtgott-Roth, The FDA Should Be in Ebola-Mode All the Time, ECONOMICS 21 (Sept. 23,
2014), https://economics21.org/html/fda-should-be-ebola-mode-all-time-1098.html.
14
MGMT. SCI. FOR HEALTH, MANAGING ACCESS TO MEDICINES AND HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES, 101
(2012), https://www.msh.org/sites/msh.org/files/mds3-jan2014.pdf.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 102.
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will explain the regulatory framework present in the U.S. established by the FDA,
while Subsection B will explain the regulatory framework in the European Union
(EU) made through the European Medicines Agency (EMA), and will specifically
provide examples from Germany and the United Kingdom (U.K.). Part II will
highlight the main points in the debate over the use of experimental drugs in the
context of the AIDS crisis and Ebola crisis. Part III delves into further detail in
the specific context of the Ebola crisis and exemplifies how the debate on
experimental drugs can be seen through the eyes of those addressing ethical
questions over drug regulation in the most recent public health crisis. Lastly, Part
IV seeks to demonstrate the importance of this issue in light of the Ebola crisis
and describes what has been enfolding in its wake, in particular the “Right to Try”
movement. Part IV emphasizes the potential risks and harms that will come
about should the goals of the “Right to Try” movement be realized.
Ultimately this Note will argue that, unlike what many patients believe, the
FDA plays an invaluable and imperative role in seeking the efficacy and safety of
new treatment options and drugs. The balance of interests between those who are
terminally ill, who wish to see increased access to unapproved medicines; the
general public, who has an interest in preserving the drug approval process; and
the FDA, who has been mandated by law to safeguard the safety of the general
public, creates a tension that will continue to go unresolved. Thus, the patients
who continue to advocate for routes outside of the FDA regulatory process—
threatening to diminish the strength of the FDA’s presence and to remove many
new, unapproved drugs from the FDA’s jurisdiction—place the future of drug
development and regulation in peril. The FDA’s role should not be eradicated,
but instead it should be bolstered and preserved. Public health crises prove not
that drug regulation is overly cumbersome, unnecessary, and a death sentence for
patients, but rather that there has never been more of a reason to preserve the role
the FDA has received by law.

I. EXPANDED ACCESS AND THE DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS

Generally, in order to be approved for sale, drugs must satisfy four standards:
efficacy, safety, quality, and clinical use information. The medication must be
effective for the indications claimed, it cannot display risks that outweigh its
potential benefits, it should be well made, and all clinical information regarding
its use—precautions, adverse effects, and so on—must be provided.18
Regulations are present in national legislation and regulatory frameworks as well
as in international guidelines presented by various conferences and organizations,
including, among others, the WHO, the International Conference on
Harmonisation, and the International Conference on Drug Regulatory
Authorities.19

18
19

Id. at 177.
Id. at 3–4, 18.
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A. The Drug Approval Process: The U.S.
The FDA in the U.S. is enabled for the regulation of pharmaceutical products
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).20 From the Act’s
inception, the central focus has been ensuring that the requirement of adequate
testing before use is enforced.21 Under current federal law, a drug is required to
be the “subject of an approved marketing application before it is transported and
distributed across state lines.”22 The FDA requires that there be substantial
evidence that a “drug is safe and effective for its intended use,” and thus the
pharmaceutical industry is the subject of “rigorous statistical testing
procedures.”23 After a drug has been tested on animals, the manufacturer must
complete a “Notice of Claimed Investigational Exemption for a New Drug” in
order for the drug to be safely given to human volunteers.24 After a drug receives
“investigational new drug” (IND) status, clinical studies are divided into three
phases using ever-increasing populations of human patients. The molecule to be
tested on humans changes in legal status at this point under the Act and is
therefore subject to specific requirements under the regulatory system at that
time.25 Phase I trials allow the drug to be given to a small group of individuals
and Phase II expands the number of patients who can receive the drug.26 While
these earlier stages of clinical trials focus on toxicity and efficacy, Phase III trials
focus on the safety and effectiveness in long-term use, observing side effects and
interactions with other drugs.27 A “New Drug Application” (NDA), or a request
for marketing approval, will then be filed and awaits final approval depending on
a showing of “‘substantial evidence’ that the drug is safe and effective, and that it
satisfies the [FDA’s requirements] as to the contents of the ‘package insert.’”28
FDA review of NDAs is statutorily prescribed at 180 days, but in reality can take
as long as thirty months.29
Despite having procedures that are generally similar to those of foreign
countries, the FDA has been criticized for its “drug lag” and has responded to
criticism by enabling quicker clinical trial progress and quicker access to
experimental and investigational drugs that have not completed the entire
approval process.30 There are multiple ways for a patient to bypass normal FDA
20

See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1938); see also Teff, supra note 1, at

573.
21

See Teff, supra note 1, at 573.
Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 1, 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/Approval
Applications/InvestigationalNewDrugINDApplication/default.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2017).
23
See Teff, supra note 1, at 573–74.
24
Id. at 576.
25
See Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, supra note 22.
26
See Teff, supra note 1, at 576.
27
See id.
28
Id. at 577.
29
See Alison R. McCabe, Note, A Precarious Balancing Act—The Role of the FDA as Protector of
Public Health and Industry Wealth, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 787, 791 (2003).
30
See KANE & SINGER, supra note 2, at 15 (“[C]ommentators claim that because of this ‘drug lag,’
the FDA drug approval process requirements have caused more deaths and suffering than they have
prevented.”); see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.305; see also Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for
Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,900 (Aug. 13, 2009) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 312 and 316) (“The
final rule is intended to improve access to investigational drugs for patients with serious or immediately
22
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regulatory procedure in order to gain access to a new drug. Patients can gain
quicker access to unapproved drugs through compassionate use and expanded
access programs. The FDA provides for several quicker routes to access and
clinical testing that include emergency use or treatment INDs, emergency
investigational new drug applications (EINDs), fast-track designations to speed
up the traditional approval process, and emergency use authorizations (EUAs)
preserved for the most extreme circumstances.
If a patient is not eligible to participate in a clinical trial, a drug developer
and physician may submit an application, reviewed by the FDA on a case-by-case
basis, in order for the patient to receive a “compassionate exemption.” The
exemption will be granted on a showing that: (a) the patient has given informed
consent, (b) there is no satisfactory alternative treatment, and (c) the drug is likely
effective and free of unreasonable risks.31 INDs may also be expedited to meet a
patient’s need. An emergency-use IND allows the FDA, for instance, to authorize
use of an experimental drug in a situation that does not permit enough time for
submission of a typical IND. In addition, treatment INDs allow use of
experimental drugs, which show promise in clinical testing for serious, or
immediately life-threatening conditions. The use can take place while the final
clinical work and FDA review is completed.32 The FDA grants these exemptions
but with the intention of scrutinizing requests and allowing for exceptions only in
true emergencies.33 Lastly, physicians may wish to pursue an EIND. To qualify,
a physician must show that they consider the product may be urgently needed for
the patient’s serious or life-threatening condition, no satisfactory alternative
therapy is available, and the patient cannot receive the product through any
existing clinical trials or expanded access protocols.34
There are also ways to speed up the testing and review processes, such as
“fast track” and “priority review” programs, that are specifically designed for a
drug that has been “designated as a qualified infectious disease product.”35 “Fast
track” designation is intended to bring the drug to market expeditiously and is set
forth in Section 506(b) of the Act.36 The designation applies only for the specific
use for which it is studied and the circumstances must satisfy the definition of
“serious condition” laid out in Section III.A. in the Guidance. Furthermore there
must be an unmet medical need or a “condition whose treatment or diagnosis is
not addressed adequately by available therapy”—for instance, a condition which

life-threatening diseases or conditions who lack other therapeutic options and who may benefit from such
therapies.”).
31
KANE & SINGER, supra note 2, § 39:15.
32
Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, supra note 22.
33
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EXPANDED ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS FOR TREATMENT
USE 13 (2016), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/
ucm351261.pdf.
34
Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, supra note 22.
35
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR THE INDUSTRY: EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR
SERIOUS CONDITIONS-DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS 7 (2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidance
complianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm358301.pdf.
36
Id. at 9 (Section 506(b) provides for the designation of “fast track product . . . if it is intended,
whether alone or in combination with one or more other drugs, for the treatment of a serious or lifethreatening disease or condition, and it demonstrates the potential to address unmet medical needs for such
a disease or condition.”).
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has no or limited available treatment.37 The “fast track” designation allows for
frequent interaction with the FDA review board in order to assess the drug preIND—at the end of Phase I, at the end of Phase II, and so on—to discuss not only
the extent of safety and concerns but also other critical issues and points related to
the study design.38 In addition, the product may at some point establish its ability
to receive priority review and consideration of its marketing application before
the sponsor of the drug—a company, research institution, or other organization
that is responsible for developing the drug—has even submitted the complete
application.39
Priority review requires the FDA to take action on the marketing application
within six months, as opposed to the usual ten months in standard review.40 The
drug must be one that treats a serious condition and would provide “a significant
improvement in safety and effectiveness” of the treatment, prevention, or
diagnosis of a serious condition—as defined by the Guidance.41 Sponsors may
use scientific data—other than data from clinical trials—to compare a marketed
product with the investigational drug. They may show: superiority relating to
either safety or effectiveness; the drug’s ability to effectively treat patients who
are unable to tolerate, or whose disease failed to respond to, available therapy; or
that the drug can be used effectively with other critical agents that cannot be
combined with available therapy.
Generally, “[c]ommunication with the [FDA] is a critical aspect of expedited
programs”.42 Expedited programs, while arguably in the public interest, do put
the onus on sponsors, requiring sponsors to prepare a commercial manufacturing
program that can accommodate the demonstrated need and consumer demand so
that the drug will be available—and be a quality product—at the time of approval.
It is important to note as well that expedited programs do not immunize sponsors
from performing the necessary clinical trials and being subject to clinical trial
inspections by the FDA.43
In a circumstance like the Ebola outbreak, the FDA is equipped with yet
another exception. According to Section 564 of the Act, the “FDA Commissioner
may allow unapproved medical products or unapproved uses of approved medical
products to be used in an emergency to diagnose, treat, or prevent serious or lifethreatening diseases or conditions caused by certain threat agents when there are
no adequate, approved, and available alternatives.”44 The FDA Commissioner is

37

Id. at 4.
Id. at 9.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 25.
41
Id. at 24.
42
Id. at 25.
43
Id. at 25–26.
44
See Emergency Use Authorization, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 26, 2017),
http://www.fda.gov/EmergencyPreparedness/Counterterrorism/ucm182568.htm; see, e.g., Notice of
Emergency Use Authorizations, 80 Fed. Reg. 32,140 (Jun. 5, 2015). The recent FDA guidance letter
explains that “medical products that may be considered for an EUA are those that ‘may be effective,’” and
it explicitly notes that “the ‘may be effective’ standard for EUAs provides for a lower level of evidence
than the ‘effectiveness’ standard that FDA uses for product approvals.” U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION OF MEDICAL PRODUCTS AND RELATED AUTHORITIES: GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 7–8 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Emergency
38
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only permitted to authorize an EUA during a declared emergency, which requires
declarations from Secretary of Homeland Security, Secretary of Defense, or
Secretary of Health and Human Services that there is a “heightened risk of attack”
with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents.45 In satisfying the
requirements of Section 564, the Commissioner and the FDA are required to
assess the medical product’s potential effectiveness as well as the risks and
benefits of allowing its use. In doing so, the FDA can only make an assessment
based on the information known at the time and the current state of scientific
knowledge.46 The FDA evaluates not only domestic, but also foreign clinical trial
data as well as animal trial data. Furthermore, the FDA allows clinical experience
other than that present in controlled trials to be considered “if the circumstances
warrant.”47 When establishing a lack of adequate, approved, and available
alternatives, a potentially successful alternative product may be deemed
“unavailable” by the FDA if the available supply of the product is unable to meet
the full demands of the emergency need.48 This is by far the most liberal way to
gain access to experimental and unapproved drugs. It is a significant departure
from normal drug-approval procedures. The FDA is essentially statutorily
allowed to consider very little clinical information, and in doing so, it considers
foreign clinical data that is not part of any normal review process conducted by
the FDA. These EUAs have been issued not only for Ebola, but also for other
widespread diseases such as Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS),
Anthrax, and Avian Flu.49
B. The Drug Approval Process Abroad: The EU
Access to experimental treatment and investigational drugs is subject to
regulation in the EU as well. Similar to the act enabling the FDA, Directive
2001/83/EC of the European Parliament requires that rules governing the
production, distribution, and use of medicinal products must safeguard the public
health while also promoting the development of the pharmaceutical industry and
trade of medicinal products in the EU.50
As for the regulation of pharmaceutical products in Europe, the EU has taken
a more invested role in harmonizing drug regulations across Europe. Directive
65/65/EEC51 is the earliest measure taken by the EU to harmonize the safety and
efficacy standards for medicinal products, requiring the Member States to enact
laws prohibiting medicinal products from being marketed on their territories

Preparedness/Counterterrorism/MedicalCountermeasures/MCMLegalRegulatoryandPolicyFramework/UC
M493627.pdf [hereinafter FDA 2017 GUIDANCE LETTER] (emphasis added)
45
FDA 2017 GUIDANCE LETTER, supra note 44, at 5–6.
46
Id. (“FDA expects to interpret safety information in light of the seriousness of the clinical
condition, alternative therapies (if any), and the specific circumstances of the emergency.”).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Emergency Use Authorization, supra note 44.
50
Directive 2001/83 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the
Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, 2001 O.J. (L 311) 67.
51
Council Directive 65/65 of 26 January 1965 on the Approximation of Provisions Laid Down by
Law, Regulation or Administrative Action Relating to Medicinal Products, 1965 O.J. (L 22) 369.
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without approval.52 Despite ever-increasing harmonization, approval of new
pharmaceutical products is largely left up to national authorities.53 The EMA is
an agency of the EU responsible for what is called the “centralized procedure” for
drug authorization in the EU.54 The centralized procedure, which provides EU
approval of most newly developed drugs given their “high-technology,” allows
product access to several markets simultaneously and provides for time
constraints on administrative structures that speed up the time it takes these
products to go to market.55
Exemptions from normal authorization or approval procedures are also
available in the EU. For products that are eligible for authorization under the
centralized procedure, Article 83 of Regulation 726/2004 provides a legal
framework for compassionate use in the EU.56 As the Article states, “by way of
exemption from Article 6 of Directive 2001/83/EC, Member States may make a
medicinal product for human use belonging to the categories referred to in Article
3(1) and 3(2) of this Regulation available for compassionate use.”57 Under a
compassionate use program implemented by a Member State, a medicinal product
may be available to “patients with a chronically or seriously debilitating disease
or whose disease is considered to be life threatening disease, and who cannot be
treated satisfactorily by an authorized medicinal product.” 58 The medicinal
product must either be the subject of a marketing authorization application or
undergoing clinical trials.59 There are two major types of compassionate use
programs: named patient compassionate use programs and cohort compassionate
use programs.60 Whereas named patient programs are initiated by physicians on
behalf of individual patients, the manufacturer predefines the cohort programs to
allow a group of patients to access an unauthorized product.61 At the same time,
it should be remembered that compassionate use, as the EMA emphasizes, is not a
substitute for properly conducted trials.62
Compassionate use programs are coordinated and established through
national legislation of member states who decide how and when to open these
programs.63 Physicians who wish to obtain unauthorized products that seem
promising for the treatment of their patients must contact the national authorities

52

See TAMARA K. HERVEY & JEAN V. MCHALE, HEALTH LAW AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 285
(William Twinning & Christopher McGrudden eds., 2004).
53
Id. at 289.
54
Id. at 294.
55
Id.
56
Regulation 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the
Laying Down Community Procedures for the Authorization and Supervision of Medicinal Product for
Human and Veterinary Use and Establishing a European Medicines Agency, 2004 O.J. (L 135) 1.
57
Id. at 65; see EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, GUIDELINE ON COMPASSIONATE USE OF MEDICINAL
PRODUCTS, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 83 OF REGULATION (EC) NO 726/2004, 3 (2006),
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Regulatory_and_procedural_guideline/2009/10/
WC500004075.pdf.
58
Regulation 726/2004, supra note 56, at 65.
59
Id.; see EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, supra note 57, at 4.
60
See id. at 3.
61
Id. at 4.
62
See id.
63
EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE COMPASSIONATE USE OF MEDICINES IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION 2 (2010), http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2010/01/
WC500069898.pdf.
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and follow the requisite procedures.64 The EMA is responsible for providing
recommendations that neither replace national legislation nor provide a legal
framework but help to provide ways to administer, distribute, and use certain
medicines for compassionate use with the overall goal of standardizing
compassionate use programs throughout Europe.65 A limited number of
compassionate use programs are actually endorsed by the EMA.66
Expanded Access Programs allow physicians and patients to have access to
medicines that are either unauthorized—approved by the EMA but not yet
commercially available in Europe—or that are approved outside of the European
Economic Area.67 Other alternatives to compassionate use programs under
Article 83—and Articles 3(1) and 3(2)—of Regulation 726/2004 include “namedpatient basis” and “expanded access programs.” Named-patient basis programs
are similar to treatment INDs in the U.S. Physicians contact the drug
manufacturer directly for a medicinal product, which will be given to a patient
under their direct care.68 “‘Named-patient basis’ . . . should not be confused with
compassionate use [programs].”69 Under Article 5 of Directive 2001/83, a legal
basis is set forth for pre-launched medicines.70 It provides an exception to the
general rule that medicines must be approved before use or must be used during
an approved clinical trial. Although Article 5 does not detail the conditions for
authorization, the Article is intended to give the Member States the authority to
allow exceptions to the general rule. Treatment on a named-patient basis involves
physicians obtaining medicines for their patients directly from the drug
manufacturer.71 Therefore, it requires that physicians bear the sole responsibility
for the treatment of their patients. Expanded access programs provide another
avenue to early access to medicines directly from the drug manufacturer.72
Patients who have received a medicine during a clinical trial and have benefitted
from the treatment may continue treatment through an expanded access program
authorized by the national authority.73 “It should be recognised that all medicines
whether supplied via compassionate use or expanded access [programs] or as a
‘named patient’ supply are unlicensed medicines, and therefore information on
their safety and efficacy may in some cases be limited to early phase clinical
trials.”74
Throughout Europe generally, individual member states have nationalized
their own regulations regarding the use and availability of unauthorized
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medicines.75 Despite harmonized regulations such as Regulation 726/2004/EC,
“regulations differ widely among analyzed countries, due to differences in
national medical practices, resources available, product funding, hospital
structures and national insurance systems.”76 National regulations will differ
based on the eligibility requirements, procedural elements, and review times.77
Furthermore, there are many member states that have not put an expanded access
program in place and have instead relied on compassionate use programs alone.
Germany, for example, implements a “Hardship Case Program” through which a
group of patients are able to gain access to medicines that have not yet been
approved.78
Compassionate use programs were introduced in Germany as part of an
amendment to the German Medicines Act in 200979—an example of another legal
exception to the traditional approval process. Generally, medicines are governed
by the Bundesinstitut für Arzneimittel Medizinprodukte [the Federal Institute for
Drugs and Medical Devices].80 The German Medicines Act dictates that
medicinal products are exempt from marketing authorization if they are meant for
treatment of diseases that are life-threatening or result in severe disabilities, and
cannot be treated satisfactorily with any approved product.81 Prior to 2009,
German law authorized the use of unapproved medicinal products only to the
extent it qualified as a “justifiable emergencies” under the criminal code.82 This
changed with the Fifteenth Amendment to the German Medicines Act that
outlined additional requirements, including patient informed consent and securing
approval from the proficient authority.83 According to Drug Hardship Ordinance
of 2010, a compassionate use program will allow unauthorized medicinal
products to be accessible to a group of patients if sufficient indications of efficacy
and safety of the product exist and if a clinical trial is being conducted or an
application for marketing authorization has been submitted to the EMA.84 Again,
only patients suffering from diseases which result in death or severe disability are
eligible to participate and only if other authorized products do not provide
75
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satisfactory treatment for the disease.85 The Drug Hardship Ordinance also
provides that the federal authority may object to patients’ participation in the
program if the prerequisites for the implementation of the compassionate use
program are not fulfilled or there are indications that the information submitted is
incorrect or that the safe use of the medicinal product is not guaranteed.86
Unlike in Germany, the use of unlicensed medicines on a “named patient
basis” is a widely used practice in the U.K.87
[B]ecause of the continually evolving area of oncology
medicine, clinicians want to be able to prescribe outside this
product license on a named patient basis—either an unlicensed
drug or drugs unlicensed for specific indications if, in their
professional opinion, they consider this to be the best option for
a patient.88
The responsible regulatory body, the Medicines and Healthcare Products
Regulatory Agency, requires generally, under the Medicines Act of 1968, that all
medicines have a marketing authorization or product license if they are
manufactured or marketed in the U.K.89 The U.K. provides another example of a
European regulatory regime. There are three instances in the U.K. in which an
unlicensed medicine may be prescribed. The unlicensed medicine may be
prescribed (1) for uses that are outside the license scope of the prescribed diseases
or conditions, (2) if the product is one which has been specially mixed for an
individual patient because that patient’s needs cannot be met by a licensed
product, or (3) if the unlicensed product is either licensed in another country or is
undergoing clinical trials.90
Even unlicensed products appear to be highly controlled in their use.
Hospital Pharmacy Quality Assurance departments assess any unlicensed
medication before it is released and maintain any necessary recorded
information.91 In addition, most unlicensed products are subject to approval by
Drugs and Therapeutics Committees prior to when they are introduced on the
hospital formulary.92 The U.K. provides compassionate use programs and
expanded access programs as well. Special need programs allow physicians to
provide patients who suffer from severe conditions a medicinal product without
market approval in the U.K.93 In addition, the Earlier Access to Medicine
Scheme provides access to medicines that are particularly promising and have a
clearly positive risk-benefit balance.94 This scheme typically provides access
85
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between the end of phase III trials and licensing.95 A regional division of the
U.K. National Health Service provides guidelines for providing access to
unlicensed products outside of clinical trials. These guidelines require prescribers
to believe the product will be favorable for the patient, obtain the patient’s
consent before treatment, and explain to patients that the medicine is unlicensed.96
The U.K. provides for the ethical review of compassionate use by the clinical
ethics committee as well. 97 In addition, treatment in clinical trials will be
extended to the patient at the trial’s conclusion if the participant is benefitting
from the device or product under expanded access.98
As the spread of a life-threatening disease like Ebola becomes a world-wide
public health crisis, the EMA as well as the WHO, like the FDA, have emergency
use procedures in place to accelerate access to unauthorized medical products.99
The EMA provides for conditional approval of products, despite limited data, in
emergencies.100 Under Decision 2119/98/EC of the European Parliament,
member states are also urged in public health emergencies to provide rapid
communication with the Commission and “exchange relevant data and
information immediately via the Community network,” thereby allowing more
coordination than may otherwise exist between nations.101 The EMA is also
equipped to accelerate the availability and use of high-quality medicines by their
rapid scientific advice protocol. The Agency will provide the drug manufacturers
advice on appropriate tests and studies to use in developing a medicine. This
prevents objections from popping up later when the drug is evaluated for
marketing authorization.102 In the case of a rare disease, protocol assistance
allows the EMA to answer questions specific to a designated orphan medicine.
Orphan designation is a tool used by the EMA to incentivize the development of
drugs for those diseases that are more rare, affect a smaller population, and that
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often is not financially “worth it” for drug companies to produce medicines for.103
Similarly, WHO reviews three criteria before allowing the use of unapproved
products in an emergency:
1. Review of technical documentation relating to safety and performance (for
example, analytical and clinical evidence, stability data);
2. Review of the documentation relating to the manufacture of the product
and the manufacturer’s quality management system (QMS);
3. An independent laboratory evaluation coordinated by WHO of the
product’s performance and operational characteristics.104
It seems by the language of these procedures that both the emergency
procedure in place at the EMA and the procedure put in place by the WHO
provide for more information about the sponsor of the drug and the drug itself
than the emergency exception given to the FDA by law. The EMA emergency
protocols focus on coordination and more of a priority review type action as
compared to the FDA, which by law is granted the ability to “bend” all of its
existing rules and procedures.

II. THE DEBATE

The essential issue, and the reason why this debate might never have a
conclusion, is that our humanitarian instinct and the autonomy of patients as
individuals to maximize their ability to thrive and seek health are at odds with, for
instance, the ultimate mission of regulatory bodies such as the FDA which is
mandated to promote the common good in public health. “Currently, the U.S. has
the safest, most effective vaccine supply in its history” and that is certainly not
something the country achieved alone.105 The FDA holds as its mission the
promotion and protection of public health. “The safety of the U.S. drug supply
contributes to the nation’s health, and FDA is the agency responsible for ensuring
this safety.”106 Among its obligations in accomplishing its mission, the FDA
103
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focuses on three key aspects to promote and protect public health: assuring the
safety and effectiveness of vaccines and other biological products, helping to be a
catalyst for product innovations, and giving the public accurate and science-based
information so that they use medicines to improve health.107
On the other hand, a prominent ethical argument in favor of expanded access,
for example, promotes the idea that “patients should have a right to mitigate
extreme suffering and to enhance self-preservation. . . . [A]s rational actors,
patients are presumed to be capable of making well-informed treatment decisions
in consultation with their physicians.”108 Without regard to the long-term
negative effects of increased expanded access—such as delays in drug
development, approval, and participation in preapproved clinical trials—patients
at risk of terminal illnesses often advocate for the right to be able to utilize their
own risk-benefit calculus and make their own treatment decisions that they deem
appropriate. Many critics have issues with such a stance, since studies showing
that informational asymmetries lead to patient vulnerability along with the
public’s risk comprehension being low.109 And these two shortcomings
demonstrate just a couple of the risks in increasing expanded access.
Despite the established existence of exceptions to the normal drug approval
process that clearly exist—not just in the U.S., but also around the world—the
practice is not blindly accepted. The debate over experimental drugs and the
efficacy of the FDA’s new drug approval process is not a new one. In fact, much
of the tension and concerns in the context of recent public health crises like Ebola
were raised in the context of AIDS treatment and cancer treatment over the last
twenty to thirty years as well. It comes down to what has been described as a
“utilitarian calculus” or “an attempt to balance competing social interests.” 110
There is a tension between “new drug development hold[ing] out the promise of
innovative treatments for debilitating disease, for extending the human life span,
and for relief of suffering . . .” and “[o]n the other hand, the introduction of
inadequately tested new drugs creat[ing] the risk of iatrogenic injuries through
toxic side effects, carcinogenicity, et cetera.”111 Tension exists between the push
for improved access to new treatments and the FDA’s responsibility to ensure and
maintain the safety and effectiveness of new drugs.112 Activists continue to
confront the inevitable conundrum of wanting both safe and effective drugs while
also criticizing the regulation of an industry that cannot possibly satisfy all
competing interests at once. Even when the FDA is more willing to risk making
new drugs available even if they later prove ineffective or unsafe, activists still
claim that the FDA has not gone far enough.113
The adequate balance of interests, risks, and benefits becomes all too
complicated in the context of public health crises like AIDS. Similar to the Ebola
107
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crisis of 2014, the AIDS crisis erupted in the context of what many believe was
conservative regulation over new drugs absent any existing approved treatment in
the U.S.114 Criticism soared as frustrated, terminally ill patients saw those same
treatments rejected in the U.S. but approved in several countries abroad.115 As
Anne Wells wrote,
AIDS constitutes a worldwide epidemic of an entirely new,
infectious, and as of today, inevitably fatal disease unlike any
faced in modern history. Because of the unique nature of the
challenge that AIDS presents, the current “business as usual”
approach taken by the federal government and the FDA is
inadequate. FDA administrative regulations have overdeveloped
to the point where they actually harm those that they were
designed to protect.116
Critics, especially terminally ill patients suffering from fatal diseases like AIDS,
consider the FDA’s process as a means of “sacrific[ing] today’s AIDS patients in
order to save tomorrow’s patients.”117 Of course to a patient with no other
alternative other than an unapproved, experimental alternative, the choice is
simple. The risks involved behind clinical trials using placebos and needing
supporting evidence to show that the treatment is in fact safe and effective simply
become irrelevant.118
Instead, the FDA’s gatekeeping measures and
precautionary, protective responses are simply a “death sentence.”119
The problem, however, is that terminally ill patients come to quite a different
risk-benefit calculation than the general public.120 “[T]he issue becomes whether
it is ethical for the FDA to place greater emphasis on its long term regulatory
needs than on the immediate needs of individual patients.”121 The court in recent
years implicitly spoke to this issue when it ruled in Abigail Alliance v. Von
Eschenbach that there is in fact no fundamental right to try experimental drugs,122
effectively preventing terminally ill patients from constitutionally overriding the
place of the FDA. In a suit against the FDA Commissioner and the Secretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services, patients sought to enjoin the FDA
from preventing the distribution of drugs that had passed Phase I of the approval
process to terminally ill patients.123 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit ruled against Abigail Alliance, holding that terminally ill
patients do not have a constitutional right to unapproved drugs and that it was not
a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause.124 Since the Supreme
114
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Court denied certiorari in 2008, the constitutional answer to the ethical question
of whether the FDA may place greater emphasis on its long-term regulatory needs
than on the immediate needs of individual patients ethical question is a
resounding “yes.”
Much of the criticism of the FDA is based off of observations regarding drug
approval processes in European countries. Concerns have been raised throughout
history with regard to the prevalent “American drug lag,” pressuring the FDA to
change its regulations to look more like its European counterparts and to
incorporate foreign clinical data in order to speed up the FDA’s approval
process.125 All of the criticism and pressure continues today despite the fact that
the EU considers the FDA to be the “gold standard approval body.”126
Yet the situation is far too complex for patients to comprehend, and it seems
that criticism of the FDA is somewhat unfounded. Several scholars have
questioned the ability of critics to even compare the FDA’s approval process to its
European counterpart.127 In a recent study, oncology journals attempted to
compare FDA and EMA approval efficacies and did not come away with any
answers as to why these agencies are capable of arriving at different approval
outcomes for the same drug, with the same data and clinical trials.128 If anything,
the European drug approval process has become more legalistic and seems to
many, over time, to be more cumbersome than the FDA process since it involves
both a central agency and individual member states.129 Furthermore, the FDA and
EMA simply have a different focus in their respective approval processes. “The
FDA continues to place its focus on the manufacturing facilities—much more so
than do the European authorities. The EU instead places its focus on process
control analysis.”130
In a recent study of the differences in approval outcomes concerning the
exact same drugs, it was clear that “[m]ost if not all of the differences in
authori[zations] . . . are not about drugs with clear efficacy benefits compared
with risk, but concern agents where there is highly complex detail about narrow
therapeutic margins between benefit and harm.”131 In the end, drug approval is a
matter of different value judgments and interpretations—of the proper level of
risk and benefit—by human beings from different cultures and in the context of
not only the interests of patients, but of political pressures and moral
conclusions.132 Overall, it is not a blanket conclusion that European drug
approvals take significantly less time than those in the U.S., nor can it be said that
FDA approval requirements are more inflexible and leave struggling patients with
less access to experimental treatment than existing European requirements. As
Beishon iterates, “[d]ifferences can also arise because of timing and the options
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open to the regulator, in particular the FDA, which is often the first to receive an
application for a drug, and also tends to implement more fast-track and
conditional procedures than the EMA.”133 RAPS also points out that in 2013
alone the FDA surpassed the EMA in approving new molecular entitiesl,134 or
“first in-world approvals.”135
In the end, it must be recognized that because the FDA’s mission is to
promote and protect public health, the FDA and the U.S. generally play a role in
developing new vaccines which has been recognized as among the many global
public goods. Americans do, and should, care about global development in the
arena of health because in recent times the U.S. has been at the forefront of
research and development in efforts to eradicate disease and epidemics, despite
criticism. Its efforts with global partners have spurred much of the important
progress in vaccine development.
U.S. resources and research and technical capacity committed to
health are unparalleled. Total U.S. public spending on medical
research and development equals that of all other nations
combined. Over many decades, a good proportion of this
spending has gone toward the prevention and control of diseases
most prevalent in developing countries. Scientists at the
publicly funded National Institutes of Health (NIH) helped
develop antiretroviral drugs to treat HIV/AIDS and to prevent
mother-to-child transmission during birth, saving lives at home
and across the developing world. The NIH’s Vaccine Research
Center is at the forefront of developing new vaccines for some
of the most dangerous diseases, such as swine flu and Ebola.
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) leads
efforts to monitor, isolate, and treat infectious diseases,
protecting the health of Americans as well as people around the
globe.136
Furthermore, while it is difficult to accept, patients must understand that the
proper balance—between government regulation and personal autonomy,
between regulation of new drugs and the degree of accepted experimentation, and
between satisfying the needs of pharmaceutical companies with the means to
control the development of new treatments and the safety of consumers—is a
balance that may never be perfectly struck regardless of changes to existing
regulation.137 As Michael Greenberg explains in the context of the AIDS crisis,
On the one hand, for people confronting sickness and death from
133
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AIDS-related illnesses that remain refractory to treatment with
current medications, the pace of new drug development is still
too slow, even given FDA efforts to cut years from the
development time in the new drug pipeline. On the other hand,
even some AIDS activists have questioned whether the FDA has
gone too far in abbreviating the new drug development process,
and whether the FDA has compromised traditional safety and
efficacy standards in the effort to make experimental drugs more
widely and more rapidly available.138
The solutions may very well have nothing to do with increased rights and access
to experimental medicines and treatments. Over time, there has been a consistent
request for additional funding for the FDA. There is a prominent complaint that
the FDA is being asked to produce a number of approvals and results that are
simply impossible to fulfill at an understaffed, underfunded government
regulatory body.139
Notably, this debate deals not only with the rights of patients—as tends to be
the main focus—but also ties directly to the rationale behind clinical trials and
related ethical questions, as well as residual effects that may not be apparent at
the onset.140 For instance, many critics—such as Dr. Krim of the American
Foundation for AIDS research—argue that the use of placebos in clinical testing
to be “inhumane”; especially when such a fatal disease leaves patients without an
opportunity to live if not given treatment.141 Yet, there are plenty of experimental
treatments that, without proper clinical trials, will remain ineffective. For
example, placebo-control and randomization are indispensable for research and
the furthering of future treatments that could actually eradicate grave illnesses.142
In addition, the push for earlier and increased access to experimental
medicines outside of clinical trials has not only led to truncations of the trial
process, but has also led to the postponement of research that would otherwise
have been done in the absence of increased access. These changes risk degrading
the quality of information-gathering as well as “sabotaging” the process itself.143
Additionally, changing regulations to be more accommodating to the terminally
ill patients will predictably do more than simply affect access to medicines.144
Only prioritizing the interests of terminally ill patients at the expense of clinical
research and the proper, safe development of new treatments and medicines “may
lead to an equilibrium in which everyone is worse-off. If formal clinical trials
genuinely do develop information that is otherwise impossible to obtain, then
efforts to improve individual welfare by degrading the research process may
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ultimately prove to be self-defeating gestures.”145 It is the unfortunate reality that
the effects of drugs cannot be discovered or known beforehand.
It is all too easy to forget the astounding negative and extensive effects that
could ensue in either of two extreme circumstances: a world with complete
patient autonomy and ability to access experimental treatments without regulatory
interference, or a world—as once existed before the FDA expanded the options
for earlier access to unapproved medicines—where no medicine could be
accessed without FDA approval and full clinical testing. A world with complete
patient autonomy, like the one advocated for by AIDS activists where patients
would choose for themselves what risks were worth taking and the regulatory
bureaucracy, is not the answer but rather potentially the fastest route in the race to
the bottom:
[The] extreme of a completely unregulated market has
potentially negative consequences for commercial development,
despite the prospect of superficial autonomy enhancement in a
world free from FDA interference. Exactly how manufacturers
would respond to an unregulated marketplace is unclear; but,
given the costs of advertising compared to clinical trial research,
it seems plausible that competition might favor reduced research
and increased directed marketing, especially in the absence of
any government imposed standards for proof of new drug safety
and efficacy.146
Nevertheless, we continue to be confronted in the wake of the Ebola crisis
with the same cycle that has been responsible for increased flexibility in the
FDA’s regulation of new drugs and a complete change in approach the FDA has
fostered in recent years: a disease without an existing treatment; a significant
portion of the globe’s population becoming infected with the disease; proof of the
disease’s tragic fatality rate; an ensuing public health crisis; increased patient
frustration and political activism; and the resulting liberalization of access to new,
experimental drugs and treatments that continues to move the FDA away from
protecting consumers from the effects of unapproved treatments at too early a
stage and toward a regulatory world that bows to the demands of patients. The
FDA, in response to the AIDS crisis and criticism from innumerable AIDS
patients, created many of the exceptions that now exist, including: expanded
access; parallel tracking; fast tracking; and treatment and compassionate use
exemptions, among others. That is now the world post-Ebola as well.
We are left with the ultimate questions: is over-regulation of drug approval
and the use of experimental drugs actually possible? Or has the FDA gone too far
in compromising safety and efficacy standards but continuously creating
loopholes to the access of unapproved treatments? Does this age-old debate
really leave us without any alternative but to dwindle down FDA regulation and
the agency’s mission to nothing, to satisfy the interests of patients? If the FDA
145
146
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does stay its course, does this really mean that thousands upon thousands of
terminally ill patients are “sentenced to death?”

III. EBOLA: A HEALTH CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN

For the third time since 2007, our world was faced with a public health
emergency. Officially declaring an emergency of international concern on August
8, 2014, the WHO changed the legal ramifications of doctors’ and countries’
activities and sparked debates of infinite proportions.147 When emergency laws
are set in place, they provide legal powers, options, and flexibility; but without
guidance, clarity, or set ways to utilize this flexibility to provide the best legal
response for the particular situation.148 This was the legal environment in which
doctors and regulatory bodies decided to bypass regulatory normalcy and engage
in the use of experimental drugs as well as the review of drugs in the regulatory
process without sufficient scientific information.
The FDA worked to use all of its authorities and response mechanisms to
deal with the world’s first Ebola epidemic by facilitating access to products.149 It
created an Ebola Task Force across the various divisions of the FDA, worked
with global entities to exchange information and provide orphan designation to
certain medicinal products, and used its power under the Emergency Use
Authorization to make products available that were not on the traditional
regulatory track.150 The agency worked, and continues to work as we see from
the announcement of a new Ebola vaccine,151 with medical product sponsors and
other U.S. government agencies to clarify regulatory requirements, provide riskbenefit assessments, gather scientific data, and develop agreements for “further
development and availability of medical countermeasures.”152
Beginning in September 2014, international regulators agreed to work
together cooperatively in the fight against Ebola.153 The EMA worked in parallel
with the WHO to efficiently and expediently help to bring drugs to market that
would provide treatment to the thousands of emerging Ebola cases. Specifically,
the EMA’s efforts consisted of assigning “orphan designation”154 to certain
147
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medications and providing “rapid scientific advice”155 to certain companies, such
as GlaxoSmithKline.156 Both the EMA and FDA often work to exchange
information regarding applications they had received as well as the assessment of
the respective applications.157 Additionally, the EMA—on its own and in
collaboration with the European pharmaceutical industry and the EU generally—
launched a multi-million euro program to collaborate with experts and regulators
to confront the unique challenges of Ebola and related disease research.158
In addition to the individual responses of the FDA and the EMA, the WHO
and its ethics panel—made up of researchers, ethicists, and patient safety
advocates—came to unanimous agreement that in the “special circumstances of
this Ebola outbreak it is ethical to offer unregistered treatments.”159 In other
words, the WHO decided that offering unregistered treatments is ethical, despite
the unknown efficacy of such drugs or the unknown adverse effects of these
medications, to use such treatments to cure or prevent the disease in victims.160 It
may be hard to argue against such a declaration since multiple sources call the
outbreak in 2014 the largest Ebola outbreak on record.161 Depending on the
country reporting, the death rate varied between 28–61%.162 At one point, the
WHO reported an overall death rate of 41%.163 The epidemic was responsible for
the death of over 11,000 people and the infection of 30,000 people.164 “Crisis
mode” amped up when President Obama announced his intention in September
2014 to deploy three thousand military personnel and contribute 750 million
dollars to the effort to eradicate the disease.165 To most people, it seemed like
desperate times called for desperate measures. The flexibility provided by the
emergency legal regime, prompted by the WHO’s and President Obama’s
declaration of an international health emergency, aided the FDA and WHO in
facilitating the use of drugs that would otherwise have still been under FDA
review.
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A. Ethical Considerations Revisited
Again, it is important to pause and observe the environment in which these
“life or death decisions” were made. In a climate of fear and desperation,
decisions were made, experimental drugs were provided, and ethical and legal
debates—and their consequences—ensued, continuing to trouble ethics and
scientific experts today, even after the announcement of an efficacious Ebola
vaccine in the making. As Acting Chief Scientist at the FDA, Luciana Borio
explained that in times of public health emergencies and crises
we humans have a very difficult time with the idea that when we
are faced with a serious illness that we may not get a test drug
that could potentially help . . . often not considering the potential
harm. . . . Fear tends to prevail over logic but this very
understandable human reaction is not in our best individual or
common interest and that’s because most drugs that enter human
clinical trials are not proven safe and effective . . . .166
Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases, testified before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives that ZMapp was administered to several Ebola patients for the
first time as an experimental treatment—even though it was impossible to
determine at the time whether the treatment was safe or effective.167
Additionally, he referenced the work being done at that time—not in advance of
using the experimental treatment—to advance testing to determine whether the
medication was in fact safe or effective.168 Chief Scientist Luciana Borio also
availed the lack of credible scientific information for these experimental
treatments when she too testified in front of the Committee, noting above all that
[t]he investigational vaccines and treatments for Ebola are in the
earliest stages of development and have not been tested for
safety or effectiveness in humans. Currently, there are only
small amounts of some experimental products that have been
manufactured for testing. This constrains our options for both
properly assessing safety and efficacy of these investigational
products in and making material available for therapeutic use
outside of, a clinical trial (also known as expanded access) to
respond to the epidemic.169
What may seem simply like a desperate measure for a desperate time sparked the
166
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ethical and scientific debate that has ensued since the crisis about the appropriate
use of experimental drugs. As Hodge reminded the regulatory community,
“[u]nleashing a harmful experimental drug (or vaccine) on populations facing the
threat of Ebola may result in a legal and ethical firestorm, even if such harms
were unperceived or unintended.”170
Ethical considerations in this kind of public health crisis are two-fold. First,
there is the continuing question even in times of normalcy as to whether
experimental treatments should be given outside of clinical trials. Second, there
is the question of whether it is feasible to allow humans to receive experimental
treatments when clinical trials are beyond difficult to develop and lack of a
controlled method of delivering the treatment could lead to disaster. These two
questions incorporate the same balance of interests that have plagued the criticism
of the FDA throughout the past thirty years. It is hard to argue against those who
advocated to provide ZMapp and other experimental drugs to those dying from
the Ebola virus—despite the lack of scientific information and knowledge of the
risks. It is a natural human reaction to save those who are facing death rather than
to allow their health to diminish. It, however, is still imperative that physicians
and health care workers do so responsibly and with the help of regulation.
It is not the idea of conducting clinical trials or providing care to those facing
an epidemic—or even curbing rules in times of emergency—with which scholars
of all backgrounds take issue. The FDA’s Committee on Ethical and Scientific
Issues in Studying the Safety of Approved Drugs noted,
[a] trial in which the risks to participants are not outweighed by
the prospect of direct medical benefits to participants may be
justifiable if a question of pressing public health importance
cannot be properly answered without the conduct of the trial and
if other conditions intended to safeguard the rights and interests
of participants are satisfied.171
Clearly the FDA has rationalized instances in which trials are necessarily
conducted if the public health importance requires it. Rather, it is the extent to
which those rules are curbed and the abandonment of law’s delegation in times of
emergency that unnerves those who have been part of the academic dialogue. As
explained in Section I, the FDA has empowered itself in times of health crises to
make decisions based on extremely little information. The FDA has been
pressured time and time again to loosen its regulatory grip on the drug approval
process. The FDA has been bullied into continuing to offer more increased
access to medicines in times when the FDA would normally take years to
adequately assess the drug’s safety and effectiveness, as mandated by law. When
will patients be satisfied with the FDA’s role in controlling access to medicine?
There will come a time where exceptions will outgrow the rules, when the FDA’s
role is moot and no longer provides what it has been mandated to do by law:
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develop safe and effective new medicines. This trend is not only detrimental in
normal times but it is also threatening in times of public health emergency as
demonstrated by points made throughout the debate on compassionate use during
the Ebola outbreak.
As the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
testified before Congress, “[i]t is important to balance the urgency to deploy
investigational medical countermeasures in an emergency such as the current
Ebola outbreak with the need to ensure the maximal safety and to determine the
efficacy of candidate drugs and vaccines for Ebola.”172 Yet, experimental drugs
were employed impulsively with very little information on their safety and
effectiveness, without any protocol to determine in such an emergency which
scientific factors health officials were required to consider before use and which
factors could wait to be discovered, and without any information as to side effects
or pain.173 Moreover, critics pushed the FDA to review drug applications in a
matter of days rather than in a matter of months or even years.174 The FDA has
admitted to “bending” its rules in order to deal with the crisis, leaving some
critics to wonder how safe their decisions actually were.175 It begs the question of
whether the FDA would have been able to pursue the same course of action if the
crisis had happened in the U.S.176
The issues with using experimental treatment in emergency situations such as
Ebola continue to compound. Aside from the issues within the regulatory body’s
decision making, there is simply a lack of information on the ground to best
evaluate risks and benefits to patients.
Triage in scarce, established treatments is often possible when
the natural history of the disease, medication effects, and status
of the patient are taken into account. Yet, with experimental
treatments, few of these factors can be determined vis-à-vis the
effect of the drug—one loses the ability to discern the patients
likely to benefit. With this inability to properly triage, the
consequences of misuse may be 3-fold: poorer outcomes for the
“treated” severely ill population, missed opportunities for
realistically treatable patients, and a possible induction of
resistance that bears worse outcomes for future patients.177
The drug-testing regulations put forth by the FDA are meant to define the safety
172
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of new drugs’ use while also developing an adequate understanding of their
nature before the average consumer may use them. Yet, using experimental drugs
bypasses these requirements; therefore, there is no evidence to support the drug’s
use before human beings receive it. It may be one thing to allow this practice in a
controlled situation with physician approval, a complete evaluation of the
patient’s illness and prognosis, and a discussion of available options—as takes
place under normal compassionate use or expanded access procedures. Imagine
employing such a practice on a widespread scale in the middle of an epidemic.178
Patients do not get the information they need nor are they able to evaluate their
situation properly to understand the risks and benefits to them and the society
using these experimental treatments.
The concerns go beyond those of actually risking a patient’s health, however.
There is agreement across the board that the gold standard in drug development is
randomized and controlled clinical trials. No expert would dispute the fact that to
properly encourage safe and effective drug development, the drug approval
process involving stages of clinical trials must be utilized. In the case of Ebola,
no existing treatment existed and the only alternatives were experimental drugs
that had not yet gone through the drug approval process. Regulators were only
left with the choice to conduct clinical trials in the midst of the crisis in order to at
least obtain information that could lead to drug approval and mitigation of the
ongoing epidemic in the future.
Even when a clinical trial is set up in the middle of an epidemic, there are
practical issues that act as deterrents in certain circumstances from setting up
clinical trials in a time of crisis. As Foreign Affairs reports, “[r]outine health care
had collapsed in all three affected countries, and even minor medical
complications, in childbirth, car accidents, and simple falls, were proving
lethal.”179 Advanced healthcare did not exist in the countries in which the disease
was spreading and this will not be unique to the Ebola outbreak. Additionally,
the volunteer physicians were dealing with a population of patients with an
entirely different culture and understanding of health-related concepts. Issues
with adequately informing patients about the disease and the experimental nature
of the treatment ensue. “[P]hysicians’ ability to meaningfully inform vulnerable
populations is overestimated. The belief that informed consent is understood by
patients naive to advanced health care, especially in an epidemic, is cavalier.”180
As a result, there is essentially no such thing as meaningful informed
consent—the most important legal and ethical component of using experimental
drugs. First, a patient suffering from Ebola cannot possibly be able to rationally
assess the benefits and risks associated with receiving the unapproved drug.
Second, physicians operated, and operate in other outbreaks, in countries with
very little resources where hundreds of cases erupt each day. Imagine the chaos
ensuing as physicians attempt to treat as quickly as possible, and the lack of
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understanding and trust a patient must have in this dire situation. Using
experimental drugs is technically ethical, but that presupposes the ability to obtain
informed consent and perform an evaluation of the risks and benefits to the
patient, both of which could not adequately come to fruition in the Ebola
epidemic and likely will not come to fruition in a future outbreak.181 Comparing
this situation in the Ebola crisis to the four ultimate goals and requirements of the
law enabling the FDA, there is no question that medical authorities were asked to
do more than slightly “bend” the rules.
The critical ethical dilemma that has been debated most often is: who should
receive the experimental drug that is only available in limited supply? Critics
took issue with the fact that two Americans received the doses as opposed to
native African patients.182 There is not, and never will be, a right answer to this
question. So how should doctors deal with this question in increased magnitude
when a clinical trial is supposed to have a control group? “[H]ow can researchers
justify a control group in the first place, given a mortality rate approaching 60
percent?”183 Yet without such a controlled group and an actual clinical,
randomized trial, patients who survive from the treatment do not actually tell us
anything about the safety or efficacy of the medication.184 It is the unfortunate
reality that using experimental drugs in an epidemic and “[a]llowing
considerations of rescue rather than scientific hypotheses to drive use of novel
agents . . . risks compromising the acquisition of knowledge needed to clarify
their role in the next epidemic and ultimately to maximize benefits for
patients.”185
B. The Recent Results from the rVSV-ZEBOV Trial and the Lessons Learned
The debate is no different after the release of a report in The Lancet that
details the trial conducted by researchers on a new drug rVSV-ZEBOV at the
latter half of the Ebola epidemic. The vaccine and the trials leading up to this
point have been praised, not only for their efficacy but also for the ethical
consideration that prompted the design of the trial as well as its success. A
testament to the effectiveness of global collaboration, attention, and resources, the
vaccine was tested using a ring vaccination strategy in “record time-just two
years.”186 Because of the results, the vaccine awaits official approval by the FDA
and the WHO in 2018.187 While the new vaccine presents an answer for future
populations battling the horrific disease, many scientists are still hesitant to praise
the work done during an epidemic. Scientists wrote in The Lancet report that “[a]
181
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devastating outbreak of Ebola virus disease is clearly not the ideal situation for
doing a vaccine trial.”188
In designing clinical trials—and particularly in emergency situations such as
these—the same ethical questions and trade-offs continue to arise:
Early scholars . . . clearly recognized that there was often an
inherent trade-off between ethical requirements and scientific
rigor. The means to resolving the trade-off came not necessarily
through insisting on validity over ethics, but rather in reaching
consensus on what is at stake. If a significant reduction in
mortality might be gained from an experimental treatment, then
health care providers need not be absolutely certain that it is
highly effective before prescribing it . . . . In other situations,
ethical and epistemic considerations may point in the same
direction.189
Scientists sought to responsibly wrestle with this trade-off when they
designed the trial of rVSV-ZEBOV. They chose what is called the “ring
vaccination strategy”—the type of trial used to eradicate smallpox. In so
choosing, ethical considerations played an important role. Ring vaccination is
defined as follows: an infection control measure that vaccinates clusters of
individuals with the experimental treatment who are at high risk for disease
infection based on their connection with a known case of a disease.190 The ring
vaccination strategy was thought to be ethically superior to other trial designs,
specifically because it entailed all participants receiving a dose of the treatment as
opposed to placebo-controlled trials, in which a random group of individuals
received a placebo instead. The placebo approach is often ridiculed in a
particular instance like an epidemic because it deprives a certain group of
treatment. Oftentimes there is risk for bias in choosing groups, which receive
treatment as well. Additionally, the ring vaccination strategy prioritized those
candidates who were at the highest risk of contracting disease. Randomization
was also involved, as certain individuals received the vaccine after twenty-one
days and others immediately.191 The trial team carefully planned and executed
ways to ensure that participants were monitored, educated, and had consented
prior to participation. The study team gave infection prevention advice, created a
188
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Guinean Ebola response team locally in the community, which was responsible
for daily home visits, and conducted post-vaccination visits as well.192
Some officials, however, continue to be hesitant:
The new vaccine is “a step in the right direction but not the
ultimate solution” said Dr. Gary J. Nabel, chief scientific officer
for global health research at the Sanofi pharmaceutical company
. . . . A randomized clinical trial involving tens of thousands of
subjects is the preferred way to test any vaccine, he noted.193
It also still holds true that in communities like the one used for the trial, the sense
of urgency that accompany any health crisis in addition to a lack of community
education will increase risks of therapeutic misconceptions.194 Annette Rid and
Franklin G. Miller also raise ethical concerns about the process. They
commented, “[t]he prevailing ethical confusion about the trial design raises
concern that its broad acceptance rests on false beliefs and expectations.”195
Aside from providing treatment that had only passed Phase I, and later Phase II,
of clinical trials, Rid and Miller noted that though the study was praised for its
alternative design from a placebo-controlled trial, the clusters which received
delayed treatment were no better off than those that would have otherwise
received a placebo.196 “Sponsors, investigators, and commentators tended to
portray the trial as an ethically preferable alternative to a placebo-controlled trial
without clearly acknowledging or downplaying the fact that it, too, withheld the
study vaccine for a period of time.”197 Even scientists involved in the study
admitted in The Lancet that “the healthcare system in Guinea was strained,
potential trial participants were worried about a candidate vaccine made by
foreign people, and the Ebola virus disease response teams were facing security
issues.”198
The takeaway from this experience is, namely, that despite safeguards,
experimental treatment and public health crises pose reoccurring issues in the
quest for effective and safe medication. There is a trade-off between scientific
advancement and ethical perfection—between saving lives and ensuring an
adequate clinical testing environment. What this latest study shows is that with
the right community collaboration, the right emphasis on ethical considerations,
and the prioritization of those most at risk, there may be some prayer of coming
to a point of compromise.199
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Observing a public health crisis like Ebola requires us to think back to those
ultimate questions: does the regulatory process really give terminally ill patients
a death sentence? Can we ever resolve the natural tension between the interests
of terminally ill patients who see their death imminently awaiting—without a
cure—and the general population who has a significant interest in seeing the FDA
drug approval process work for the future of drug development? The Ebola
outbreak shows the growing concerns with the use of experimental drugs and
mandates the continuing presence of the FDA and a robust regulatory framework
that demands safety and efficacy as well as increased information to patients,
despite the costs.

IV. THE FUTURE OF DRUG REGULATION

Although the Ebola epidemic resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and led
the world to scramble to respond to a crisis it was wholly unprepared to deal
with—much like the AIDS crisis—it has positively impacted the role of
government agencies. It has also shaped emergency preparedness and the ability
of the U.S.—and the world—to adequately counter another public health
emergency of its kind. The Ebola epidemic has also been a catalyst for change
and medical innovation. “Ultimately, only the huge, explosive 2014 outbreak . . .
provided the political and economic drive to make an effective vaccine.”200 Since
the apex of the Ebola crisis, the FDA and its Commissioner, Luciana Borio, have
also made an adamant push to provide more resources and information to
advocate for clinical trials and the development of sufficient clinical trial designs.
To this end, the FDA has been accepting input since December of 2015 on
designing clinical trials in emerging infectious diseases.201 In the summer of
2016, Merck announced its Breakthrough Therapy Designation from the FDA for
the investigational Ebola Zaire Vaccine, which will expedite its development and
review.202 The FDA has also published additional and updated guidance geared
towards dealing with another potential Ebola outbreak.203 The 2014 Ebola crisis
has sparked the creation of multiple training programs and educational
opportunities for our hospital system and health care workers so that they may
have the proper understanding of how to respond to such an infectious disease.204
Additionally, protocols, including a single common clinical trial protocol, and
other guidance materials have been created to streamline emergency responses
engagement and individual consent. Despite the challenges, our team was able to do the trial in compliance
with good clinical practice and international standards.
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and preparedness for the future.205 In February 2015, the FDA disclosed revisions
to its process for compassionate use applications.206 The process will now only
require one form and thirty days. FDA officials may even grant expanded access
over the phone.207 Generally, between the efforts of the FDA, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention, and others, clinical trials have successfully been initiated and nearly
completed, showing officially that with the help of these regulatory bodies, Ebola
is in fact a survivable disease.208 The heads of these agencies have agreed that the
U.S. is much safer and better prepared than it was before the crisis.209
Yet outside of the epidemic context and public health emergency context,
terminally ill patients and other patients similarly situated criticize the FDA and
advocate access to unproven medicines. Despite the FDA approving 5,816 of the
5,849 expanded access applications it has received in the last four years, critics
argue that the FDA’s process is overly cumbersome and slow.210 Patients
advocate for increased access to experimental drugs, despite the years of revisions
to regulation and the increased number of exceptions and exemptions from the
normal rules. The “Right to Try” debate has ensued, existing alongside the Ebola
epidemic and persisting over the last year. In fact, the alarming fact is that in
over twenty-four states in America, “Right to Try” legislation has been proposed,
and in many instances passed by state legislatures, and which threaten to have
innumerable and unknown consequences for the use of experimental drugs and
the role of the FDA. Indeed, it seems to many experts that “Right to Try”
advocates, having begun their plight for drug reform during and after the Abigail
Alliance litigation, wish to get rid of FDA oversight as well as the FDA’s role in
providing earlier access to experimental treatment. “Access advocates criticize
the FDA’s substantive standards governing patient access, but what they really
object to is the review requirement itself.”211 The movement could result in the
removal of powerful drugs, without any evidence of safety or efficacy, from FDA
jurisdiction.212
Most importantly, advocates claim that this legislative movement will
increase the number of patients who will access investigational products.213
Remember, this number is unknown and could certainly be immeasurable since in
most instances the conversation for now has involved only the “terminally ill”
patients. At the same time, patients who are not terminally ill but who suffer with
no relief from existing treatments for their ailments—or face diseases without a
205
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cure—will also be seeking to try experimental drugs.214 In other words, this
movement could have undefined negative consequences for patients in general.
We are left with the ultimate question that we faced during the AIDS crisis and
continue to face as regulators and citizens battle over the proper use and
availability of unapproved drugs: “whether the gain in providing the terminally
ill with a slim chance at prolonging life is worth endangering a process designed
to ensure the public health and the development of safe, effective medicines.”215
We may indeed never have an answer, but certainly ridding the issue of
regulatory oversight and diminishing the power of the FDA’s jurisdiction and
regulatory framework are not an answer.
The Ebola crisis and all that has been improved and created since the
beginning of the public health crisis, as well as our experiences throughout the
AIDS crisis should, instead of creating disdain and criticism against the idea of
regulatory bodies in this space, highlight two important observations. It is clear
from the testimonials of U.S. commissioners in the FDA and U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, among others, that the Ebola crisis showed the harm
and ineffectiveness of not having these bodies involved from the beginning, the
benefit of using such regulatory bodies and frameworks effectively in addition to
the importance of international regulatory cooperation.
Let us use Ebola not as a ground for criticism of the FDA, its approval
process and the regulation of using unapproved drugs, but rather as an instance to
show how differently the crisis could have been handled with the efforts that were
in place at the end, had they been present from the beginning. Indeed, let us see
the Ebola outbreak as an instance to think about how differently the crisis would
have been handled absent any regulatory body to ensure that human rights were
abided by, patients were educated, and treatments were adequately administered.
It can be argued that despite the legal and ethical issues that were present, the
regulatory bodies at least attempted to safeguard patient rights, something that
would have been wholly absent if the crisis was governed merely by the natural
human reaction.
The bottom line is that criticism of “Right to Try” advocates is being
misplaced. The reasons for clinical trials, the importance of oversight, and the
jurisdiction of the FDA—if practiced wholly and effectively—is to prevent the
ethical risks highlighted above in Part III,Section A and allow the use of
experimental treatments to be somewhat tolerable.
As Dr. Arthur Caplan and Dr. Alison Bateman-House suggest, the “Right to
Try” debate and the resulting legislation is simply an understandable “impulse to
rescue individual patients facing dire diseases . . . .”216 Even though the FDA is
mandated in the U.S. to ensure the safety and efficacy of drugs that enter the
market, healthcare providers have a duty not to harm patients and pharmaceutical
companies insist that the FDA “plays a vital role in both drug development and
patient protection.” The drug approval process is endangered at the behest of
terminally ill patients and other advocates who demand to have FDA review of
214
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requests for access to investigational drugs be dispensed with and wish to access
unapproved drugs outside of clinical trials. Again we battle the unresolved
balance: “an individual patient’s very understandable desire to try to extend his
or her life versus the orderly and efficient functioning of a drug development and
clinical trial system that benefits much larger numbers of patients.”217 Except this
time we threaten to dissolve the FDA’s jurisdiction and threaten the safety and
health of those who, without understanding the risks involved, will choose to
ignore the risks and receive experimental treatments unfit for human
consumption.
To the advocates who ask, “What’s the harm?” in allowing
unrestricted access, one expert responded, “If there’s anything
worse than dying of a terminal illness, it’s dying of a terminal
illness and suffering unnecessary complications or pain for no
benefit and having to pay for the medications causing the
complications yourself.”218
The reforms these patients wish to enact are actually harmful on multiple
levels: to the pharmaceutical industry, to patient well-being, and to drug
development—not to mention many of the difficult points raised earlier in this
Note. Generally speaking, the “Right to Try” laws that have been passed in states
across the country permit terminally ill patients to request access to
investigational drugs that have yet to be approved by the FDA.219 These laws
create issues with inequitable access, lack of appropriate oversight, and informed
consent. Since the definition of the term “terminally ill” is unclear and can vary,
it neglects to include patients who will not suffer from death but have
nevertheless exhausted all existing treatment options. Moreover, patients hope to
receive experimental treatments without truly appreciating the potential health
risks they could suffer should the treatment be ineffective. “The overwhelming
majority of drugs that are found to have manageable toxicity in phase I clinical
trials do not subsequently receive FDA approval for marketing . . . . [In the end,]
the terminally ill could potentially be shortening what little time they have
left.”220 Additionally, there is a lack of oversight that occurs since there are no
specified qualifications for the health care providers or physicians providing the
assessments. Patients are not guaranteed an optimum evaluation of their
condition or their likely benefit from the experimental treatment. No rules are in
place “to stop the creation of research mills in which interventions with no
scientific evidence are promoted as possible cures, which has happened in the
field of stem-cell based treatments.”221
Furthermore, these laws do not adequately provide for rules requiring
informed consent nor do they realistically lead to a patient’s sufficient
understanding of the best and the worst outcomes that could come from the use of
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the experimental drugs. The drugs used as a result of these laws are drugs that
have only passed through Phase I testing. In other words, they have only been
tested for toxicity and adequate doses, not for safety or efficacy.222 The laws “are
patently untruthful in stating that patients will be given a description of the
‘potentially best and worst outcomes of using the investigational drug’ and a
‘realistic description of the most likely outcomes.’”223 This may also lead patients
to bypass opportunities for joining controlled clinical trials and instead be
tempted to go with the falsehood of trying the “get-well-quick” option of
receiving these unapproved drugs outside of a clinical trial with oversight.224
Over time, this could slow down the approval process and thus lead to slower
development of new drugs.225
There are additional risks from which drug companies and the
pharmaceutical industry could suffer. The biggest issue in the new “right to try”
legislation is that it does not require drug manufacturers and sponsors to comply
and grant access to medications that have only passed Phase I clinical trials. To
most, the financial incentives will not be adequate enough for sponsors to allow
expansive access to drugs in development that this new legislation seeks to
provide.226 Adverse effects patients may suffer from such things as damaging
toxicity levels could negatively impact a drug company’s ability to subsequently
receive FDA approval.227 Such a problem will not be mitigated by the fact that
doctors and drug companies are shielded from tort liability by “right to try
legislation” legislation.228 If anything, drug companies would still be advised by
legal professionals to go through the FDA approval process when given the
choice.229 Thus, legislation that patients believe will grant them early access to
drugs they would otherwise not receive will dissuade drug companies from
making them available.
What patients truly call for is deregulation in this area. They want to gain
access to medicines outside of the FDA’s jurisdiction, despite the mandates the
FDA has received by law. Bureaucracy may be cumbersome, protocols may at
times seem useless, but deregulation of the use of pharmaceutical products should
be looked at differently. Overall, as case studies abroad have found, the
deregulation of this industry has only led to unintended negative consequences.
[M]edicines deregulation triggered two effects: (i) it gave rise to
some level of distrust towards cheaper alternatives to branded
products, hence raised average medicines prices which in turn
reduced access, and (ii) it reduced product surveillance, in turn
leading to a lowering of the average quality of medicines.
Therefore, we suggest that medicines deregulation can exert
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detrimental effects by eroding trust in the quality of local
products to the benefit of international companies.230

CONCLUSION

Observing the debate over experimental drugs throughout the AIDS crisis,
the Ebola outbreak, and the “Right to Try” movement, one comes to many of the
same conclusions. The balance of interests between the terminally ill who wish
to see increased access to unapproved medicines, the general public who has an
interest in preserving the drug approval process, and the FDA who has been
mandated by law to safeguard the safety of the general public creates tension that
will continue to go unresolved. The use of unapproved drugs is in and of itself
controversial but using them in the midst of a public health crisis involving
populations without adequate health systems or understanding of healthcare is
that much more risky. There is something about using drugs that have only been
tested on monkeys that is disturbing, whether or not the patients are terminally ill.
There is something legally unsound about “bending the rules” to create more
exceptions to rules that preserve the safety of the public health. There is also
something immensely frustrating about an ethical balance that will never be
resolved or further justified, even in an epidemic.
Critics of the FDA have persisted for years, pointing to the sluggishness of
the drug approval process and the rights they think they own as citizens to
personal autonomy in healthcare decisions—including access to any treatment
that may be in existence, even if untested. These criticisms, however, are in
many instances without evidence. The same research process and drug
development process that patients and physicians criticize as overly costly and
cumbersome is the same process that cures cancer, finds cures to fatal diseases,
and makes up a large amount of industry in the U.S. It is the same process that
incentivizes drug developers to take risks to continue work and preserves the
safety of the public health. To that end, criticism of the FDA is misplaced.
The lack of a cure or treatment options for certain diseases is not so much the
fault of the FDA. Take Ebola, for example. If there is any criticism to be
warranted, it should be pointed at the fact that the outbreak was resolved through
the last minute scrambling of international organizations that should have had
emergency protocols already in place and should have been cooperating on
exchanges of information and drug development in times of normalcy. The FDA
should receive the increased funding and manpower it deserves so that their
existing framework can be carried out more effectively, not eradicated. Drug
manufacturers should receive increased incentives to develop treatment options
that, under normal circumstances, may not be the most lucrative to manufacture.
Throughout the past twenty to thirty years in particular, criticisms and public
health events have changed the nature of the regulatory framework in response.
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Out of the AIDS crisis, expanded access exceptions to the normal drug approval
process were born numerous—that continue to persist today. Observing the ways
in which the FDA has responded in past years to improve the efficacy of their
review, and the ways in which the FDA collaborated with international
institutions over the last three years, we see again the positive responses to a
momentous public health event in our history. With the large number of
exceptions to the normal drug approval process providing increased access,
however, it is difficult to envision how the regulatory framework for the use of
experimental drugs could possibly be liberalized any more.
If the cycle
continues as it has in the past after the AIDS crisis, however, we can expect
criticisms and changes to occur nonetheless. The “Right to Try” movement
provides the opportunity for change, though not for the best. Patients continue to
advocate for routes outside of the FDA regulatory process and threaten to
diminish the strength of the FDA’s presence and to remove many new,
unapproved drugs from the FDA’s jurisdiction. This can only lead to
irresponsible uses of untested drugs and decreased growth in drug development.
This sounds less like a death sentence for the terminally ill and for the general
public and their interest in sound medicine. It would truly be in the best interests
of the public to continue to preserve the FDA’s regulatory role and mitigate any
or all ethical risks associated with responding to terminal illness and infectious
disease. It is imperative to separate our natural human reactions from what the
rational and appropriate course of action necessitates. Desperate times should not
always call for desperate measures.

